Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal
Volume 3 | Number 2
A Collection of Archived Works from the Deans of Oil and Gas Law
July 2017

Overlapping Remedies and the Unexpected Termination of Oil and
Gas Leases [reprint, first published 2011]
David R. Percy, QC
David McGillivray

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Natural Resources Law Commons, and the Oil, Gas,
and Mineral Law Commons

Recommended Citation
David R. Percy, QC & David McGillivray, Overlapping Remedies and the Unexpected Termination of Oil and
Gas Leases [reprint, first published 2011], 3 OIL & GAS, NAT. RESOURCES & ENERGY J. 479 (2017),
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss2/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal by an authorized editor of
University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact LawLibraryDigitalCommons@ou.edu.

ONE J
Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal
VOLUME 3

NUMBER 2

OVERLAPPING REMEDIES AND THE
UNEXPECTED TERMINATION
OF OIL AND GAS LEASES *
[reprint, first published 2011]
DAVID R PERCY, QC & DAVID MCGILLIVRAY **
The freehold oil and gas lease in Canada has had a perilous and
uncertain existence. In the early cases, the courts applied a literal
interpretation of the leases, resulting in numerous unexpectedly terminated
leases. In recent years, there has been a resurgence of cases involving
terminated leases. Modern case law recognizes that the failure of a lease
can create liabilities in both tort and restitution, but courts have faced
difficulties in dealing with the overlapping compensatory and restitutionary
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and Gas Leases, 49 ALTA. L. REV. 251 (2011), available at https://www.albertalawreview.
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more information about the Alberta Law Review, visit https://www.albertalawreview.com/
index.php/ALR.
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remedies. The modern case law has been heavily criticized, but the authors
argue that there is a smaller difference between the overlapping remedies
than is commonly supposed when the underlying purpose of restitutionary
remedies is examined, and they propose a resolution to the problem of
overlapping remedies.
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I. Introduction
The freehold oil and gas lease in Canada has had a perilous and uncertain
existence. Cases going back as far as the early 1960s have demonstrated the
ease with which the freehold lease may come to a sudden and unexpected
end. There have been two distinct phases in the development of the
jurisprudence over this time. The first phase of cases involving failed leases
spanned the decade that stretched from 1961 to 1971. The cases were
marked by a “determinedly literalist application” of the words of the lease,
often by the Supreme Court of Canada, in a manner which “frequently
astounded those who originally prepared the document.” 1 Although a
member of the Supreme Court of Canada, in one case of literal
1. John Bishop Ballem, The Oil and Gas Lease in Canada, 4th ed (Toronto: University
of Toronto Press, 2008) at 109–10.
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interpretation, observed that he was not satisfied that “the result accords
with the intention of the parties to the instrument,” 2 this approach left the
legal landscape littered with unexpectedly terminated leases. The cases in
the first phase of Canadian law were also notable for devoting very little
attention to the remedial consequences of unexpected failure.
After 1971, there was a period of relative quiescence when few cases
involving challenges to leases reached the courts. It appeared that most of
the obvious causes of failure had been covered by improvements in
drafting, so that new leases were not often the subject of litigation.
However, the oil and gas lease can be long-lived, and many of the older
leases continued in existence with hidden pitfalls that would only be
exposed in the event of a challenge.
There has been a resurgence in cases of lease failure in the past decade.
Anecdotally it has been suggested that a rash of new actions have mounted
challenges against existing leases but they have not yet reached the courts.
This second phase of Canadian case law is no longer marked by a tendency
towards literal interpretation, but it has exposed new areas in which leases
can be vulnerable. In addition, the modern case law has placed an intense
focus on the remedies available to both parties following the failure of
lease.
The purpose of this article is primarily to deal with the remedial
consequences of the failure of leases where the production of petroleum or
natural gas has occurred after the termination of the lease. It will focus on
four major issues:
(1) A comparison of the different approaches to remedies in the first
and second phases of Canadian case law;
(2) The recognition in recent cases that the failure of a lease can
create liabilities in both tort and restitution, and the difficulties
that courts have experienced in dealing with the overlap between
these areas of law and their respective approaches to the
assessment of damages;
(3) An examination of the severe criticism of decisions in recent
cases that awarded a compensatory remedy in tort where leases
have failed and that dismissed remedies in restitution on the
grounds that they would create a windfall to the lessor;

2. Shell Oil Co v Gibbard, [1961] SCR 725 at 732, Locke J [Gibbard].
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(4) A resolution of the important issue of how restitution and
tortious remedies relate to each other, and the quantification of
damages under each approach.
In order to provide some context for the discussion of remedies, we will
briefly review in turn the six general areas which have proved vulnerable in
freehold oil and gas leases. The first three areas of vulnerability were
prominent in the first phase of the development of Canadian law, while
recent cases have involved the last three areas.
A. Failure to Drill or Pay Delay Rental
Traditional oil and gas leases often contained a provision that provided
for the automatic termination of the lease if the lessee did not commence
operations for the drilling of a well within one year from the date of the
lease. The requirement to drill a well could typically be deferred if the
lessee paid the required delay rental on or before the anniversary date of the
lease. Leases frequently failed because the lessee did not commence drilling
operations and did not pay the delay rental in accordance with the
requirements of the lease. 3
B. Operations at the End of the Primary Term
The final year of the primary term of a lease is particularly hazardous for
a lessee. The lessee no longer has the option of paying a delay rental at the
end of the final year, and many leases only allowed the lease to be extended
if the lessee achieved production before the end of the primary term. In the
first phase of the development of Canadian law, three cases involved the
production of oil and gas after the lease had terminated because the lessee
failed to bring a well into production within the primary term. They resulted
from the classic interpretation of a common variety of the freehold lease
first adopted in the Canada-Cities Service Petroleum Corp v Kininmonth
decision, 4 in which termination occurred when the lessee commenced a
well within the primary term but achieved production only after its expiry.
The cases concluded that this type of lease expired at the end of the primary
term unless a well was in production at that time.

3. See e.g. East Crest Oil Co Ltd v Strohschein (1951), 4 WWR (NS) 70 (Alta SC
(TD)), aff’d [1952] 2 DLR 432 (Alta SC (AD)).
4. [1964] SCR 439 [Kininmonth]. All three cases are discussed in the text at Part
II.B.2.
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C. The Pooling Clause
In order to maximize the production of oil and gas, Alberta was quick to
enact conservation legislation that limited the density of wells to one for
each drilling spacing unit. The normal drilling spacing unit was set at a
quarter section for an oil well and one section for a gas well. Energy
companies with rights to tracts of land that were smaller than the required
size began to include in their leases the right to pool the leased lands with
other lands in order to achieve the rights to an entire drilling spacing unit.
However, a series of cases emphasized that this alone was not enough to
validate the individual leases of each tract within the unit.
In Shell Oil Company v Gunderson, 5 the lessee had leased a quarter
section of land owned by Gunderson and pooled that land with a
neighbouring quarter section, which it had also leased. The lessee drilled a
successful gas well on the neighbouring lands and shut in production as it
was entitled to under the terms of the lease. It then paid a shut-in royalty to
the owner of the neighbouring land and to Gunderson and took the position
that both leases remained in force throughout the period of deemed
production.
When Gunderson challenged the continuing validity of the lease, the
Supreme Court of Canada noted that the habendum clause of the lease
stated that it continued for so long “as the leased substances or any of them
are produced from the said lands.” 6 The Court interpreted the habendum
literally and noted that under the terms of the lease, only the Gunderson
lands were defined as “the said lands.” The Gunderson lease thus
terminated because it could not be continued by deemed production that
occurred on neighbouring lands rather than “the said lands.”
D. The Shut-In Well Provision
From the early days of the industry, lease forms have given the lessee the
right to shut in a completed well for a variety of reasons. As long as the
requirements for a shut-in well are met and a shut-in royalty is paid
annually in accordance with the terms of the lease, the shut-in well is
deemed to be a producing well for all the purposes of the lease. Although
natural gas wells were frequently shut-in for long periods of time, it is only
in the recent phase of Canadian case law that the shut-in well provision has
proved to be fatal to a number of leases. Those cases have frequently found
5. [1960] SCR 424 [Gunderson]. See also Canadian Superior Oil of California, Ltd v
Kanstrup (1964), [1965] SCR 92.
6. Gunderson, ibid at 428 [emphasis added].
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that the lessee failed to meet the prerequisites for exercising the right to
shut in a well.
Freyberg v Fletcher Challenge Oil and Gas 7 raises important remedial
questions that are discussed in Part III of this article. There, the lease failed
because of the lessee’s failure to meet the requirements of the shut-in well
provision. The lease allowed a well to be shut-in where there was no
production “as a result of the lack of an economical or profitable market.” 8
A well on Freyberg’s land was shut-in from 1978 until 1998. In 1998
operations on Freyberg’s land were commenced and a well was brought to
production in 1999. Although shut-in well payments had been made
throughout the twenty-year period, the Alberta Court of Appeal found that
the lessee had failed to demonstrate there was a lack of an economical or
profitable market during the whole of that time. As the lessee had not
established that there was no market for the gas until 1999, the shut-in
royalty payments had not served to extend the life of the lease. In Durish v
White Resource Management Ltd, 9 the lease allowed a well to be shut-in, in
accordance with “good oil field practice.”10 The lessee had arranged for
Gulf Resources Company (Gulf) to drill a well under a farm-out agreement,
but a dispute arose over the fees for the transmission and processing of gas
charged by Gulf, and the well was shut-in. The Alberta Court of Appeal
found that the decision to shut in the well because of a fee dispute had
nothing to do with good oil field practice and, as a result, the lease had
terminated.
E. Production During the Extended Term of the Lease
The freehold lease grants land to the lessee for the specified primary
term and thereafter for an extended term, which can be defined in a variety
of ways. In Montreal Trust Co v Williston Wildcatters, 11 which will be
discussed in detail in Part III of this article, the extended term allowed the
lease to continue for so long as there was production or for so long as the
lessee was engaged in or prosecuting “drilling or working operations” 12 on
7. 2005 ABCA 46, 363 AR 35, rev’g 2002 ABQB 692, 323 AR 45 [Freyberg].
8. Ibid at para 28.
9. (1987), 82 AR 66 (QB), aff’d (1988), 63 Alta LR (2d) 265 (CA) [Durish]. For a
further example of the failure of a lease as a result of the improper application of the shut-in
well provision see 549767 Alberta Ltd v Teg Holdings Ltd (1997), 70 ACWS (3d) 355 (Alta
QB).
10. Durish, ibid at para 3.
11. 2001 SKQB 360,108 ACWS (3d) 383 at para 50, aff’d 2002 SKCA 91, 223 Sask
R276, leave to appeal to SCC refused, 29401 (30 September 2002) [Williston Wildcatters].
12. Ibid at para 4.
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the leased lands. The lease in that case was originally created in 1952. A
successful oil well was drilled in 1955 and continued in production until
1990. There was no production for a seven-month period in 1990, and
during that period, the lessee conducted only two acts that could be
classified as “working operations” under the extension clause. In the first
round of litigation that dealt with the validity of the lease, the trial judge
described these actions of the lessee as “isolated acts, widely spaced in time
and pursued only briefly. They can best be described as minimal and
futile.” 13 The lease thus expired because after the lease had been extended
by production, there was a period in which neither production nor
operations were occurring.
F. Failure to Respond to a Notice of Default
Most modern leases guard against the possibility that a breach might
automatically terminate a lease through the device of a default clause. The
clause requires the lessor to provide a notice of breach and then stipulates a
period of grace to enable the lessee to remedy the breach. The lease
terminates only if the lessee fails to remedy the breach within the stipulated
period. This eventuality arose in Canpar Holdings Ltd v Petrobank Energy
and Resources Ltd, 14 which will be discussed further in Part III of this
article. The royalty clause in a petroleum and natural gas lease required the
lessee to pay a royalty of 17.5 percent “of the greater of the actual price
received . . . or the current market value at the time and place of sale of all
these substances produced from the lands, all without any deductions.” 15
The ultimate lessee wrongly calculated royalty payments based on its
corporate average or pooling price, and failed to pay any royalties on gas
that it used as fuel for its compressors, both on and off the leased lands. The
lessors gave notice of default under the terms of the lease, but the lessee
ignored the notice, apparently confident of its interpretation of the royalty
clause. The Court found that the lessee’s confidence was misplaced and that
the lease terminated at the end of the period of grace. The Alberta Court of
Appeal did not indicate any disagreement with this conclusion, but
probably for the first time in Alberta, it granted relief against the forfeiture
of an oil and gas lease. 16 In Canpar Holdings, it reinstated the lease and
required the lessor to pay royalties in accordance with its terms. 17
13. Ibid at para 50.
14. (9 October 2009), Calgary 0601-05052 (Alta QB) [Canpar Holdings trial].
15. Ibid at 4.
16. See Nigel Bankes, “Court of Appeal grants relief from forfeiture in an oil and gas
lease case” (24 February 2011), online: ABlawg.ca <http://ablawg.ca/2011/02/24/court-of-
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II. The First Phase of Lease Failure Cases
An examination of the consequences of failed leases in the first phase of
the development of Canadian law reveals one cardinal feature. These cases
typically resulted in an order requiring the lessee to vacate the lands, with
the comment that if this result appeared harsh, it was a consequence of strict
compliance with the terms of the lease chosen by the lessee. With a single
exception, none of the cases decided during this decade provided the lessee
with any compensation for benefits that may have been conferred on the
owner of the leased lands. Indeed, the cases contain no suggestion that the
lessee could recover even payments of money, in the form of delay rentals
or shut-in royalties, which had been made to the owner in the mistaken
belief that the lease remained valid.
The courts’ failure to consider the consequences of an unexpectedly
terminated lease probably arose from two causes. First, Canadian courts
began to develop common threads in the previously disparate categories of
restitution only in the mid-1970s. 18 Until that time, there had been little
systematic analysis of the fate of benefits transferred under failed
transactions. Secondly, the case reports suggest that counsel, in the first
phase cases, framed their arguments in an attempt to avoid the termination
of leases, particularly through the doctrine of estoppel, rather than
attempting to mitigate the consequences of termination. The estoppel
arguments were almost universally unsuccessful 19 but appeared to deflect
the courts from examining whether the lessee could recover the value of
any benefits that had been transferred under the failed lease.
In order to examine the approach of the courts in the first phase of
Canadian case law, it is necessary initially to distinguish cases in which
appeal-grants-relief-from-forfeiture-in-an-oil-and-gas-lease-case/>. As Bankes points out,
relief from forfeiture was available because this involved termination for cause, while most
Canadian cases have involved leases that expressly terminated automatically, according to
their own terms.
17. 2011 ABCA 62, 331 DLR (4th) 588 [Canpar Holdings].
18. See e.g. Storthoaks (Rural Municipality of) v Mobil Oil Canada, Ltd (1975), [1976]
2 SCR 147. See also Peter D Maddaugh & John D McCamus, The Law of Restitution, 2nd ed
(Aurora, Ont: Canada Law Book, 2004) at 17–26.
19. The argument succeeded in the unique circumstances at Voyager Petroleums Ltd v
Vanguard Petroleums Ltd (1982), 47 AR 14 (QB), aff’d (1983), 47 AR 1 (CA), leave to
appeal to SCC refused, (1983), 50 AR 82n. For the general failure of estoppel arguments,
see Ballem, supra note 1 at 402–23; Nigel Bankes, “Termination of an Oil and Gas Lease,
Covenants as to Title, and Assessment of Damages for Wrongful Severance of Natural
Resources: A Comment on Williston Wildcatters” (2005) 68:1 Sask L Rev 23 at 31–33
[Bankes, “Termination”].
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there was no production of oil or gas from the failed lease from those which
dealt with the proceeds of production that had been realized after the lease
had terminated.
A. Failed Leases Where No Production Occurred
Some cases in this category did not create any controversy. There was no
realistic possibility of the lessee obtaining any form of compensation where
the lease expired without the lessee having conducted any significant
activity on the lands. The classic example of these cases occurred where the
lessee mistakenly thought that a well drilled on lands with which the
originally leased lands had been pooled was sufficient to validate the
original lease. 20 In these cases, no lasting improvements were left on the
lands subject to the original lease, and the lessee could not point to any
justification for compensation for activities that they may have conducted
on those lands.
In contrast, significant problems arose where the lessee did create an
improvement on the leased lands prior to termination. Typically, the
improvement occurred where the lessee drilled a productive well on the
leased lands only to discover that the lease had expired before the well
could be brought into production. The most common cause of this situation
occurred when the lessee decided that it was necessary to shut in a gas well
but delayed the payment of the shut-in royalty until after the primary term
had expired. These cases are a subgroup of those described in Part I.B of
this article because the fatal gap between the capping of the well and the
payment of the royalty meant that there was no actual or deemed production
at the end of the primary term, resulting in the automatic termination of the
lease. 21
A variation of this problem occurred in Republic Resources Ltd v
Ballem, 22 where the lessee commenced a gas well during the term of the
lease and completed it one week after the end of the primary term. It paid a
shut-in royalty almost immediately after the completion of the well, but the
lease terminated because there was no form of production in place when the
primary term ended. In another of the shut-in royalty cases, the Alberta
Court of Appeal recognized that this created a draconian result. It
commented that “[i]t may appear harsh that the [lessee’s] expenditure in
20. See especially Gunderson, supra note 5.
21. See e.g. Canadian Superior Oil Ltd v Paddon-Hughes Development Co Ltd, [1970]
SCR 932.
22. (1981), 33 AR 385 (QB) [Republic Resources]. See also the discussion of
Kininmonth, supra note 4, in Part II.B.2 of this article.
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drilling the well, as well as the benefit of the lease itself should be lost
through a short delay in the payment of shut-in royalties,” 23 but the Court
felt that this result was dictated by the terms of the lease. Although the
lessee in Republic Resources argued that the lessor was incontrovertibly
benefitted by the presence of a completed well on her lands, the Court felt
unable to award the lessee any compensation for the cost of drilling the
well. One of the present authors has argued that these results are contrary to
the modern law of unjust enrichment because they provide the lessor with
an uncompensated benefit, in the form of the well. The enrichment of the
lessor is not immediate but will be fully realized if and when the well is
brought into production. 24 However, none of the recent cases raise this issue
and it will not be pursued further in this article.
B. Failed Leases That Achieve Production
Although there is a strong argument that the lessee should obtain a
remedy in some cases where there has been no production under a failed
lease, the argument is compelling where there has been actual production of
petroleum or natural gas before the parties realize that the lease has failed.
In these cases, the courts typically required the lessee to vacate the lands,
with the result that the lessor received all the proceeds of future production.
In addition, the lessor usually claimed all the proceeds of production from
the date that the lease terminated, on the theory that after that time, the
lessee had no right to the produced substances. However, the lessor was in
the position of seeking all the benefits of the well and leaving the lessee to
potentially bear all the costs only because of the lessee was mistaken as to
its legal rights. These cases appeared in the first phase of the development
of Canadian law and the courts approached the remedial problems that they
raised as matters of first impression. However, before examining the
Canadian authorities, it is important to note that at that stage the freehold
lease in Canada still strongly resembled its American forbears. It is
instructive to examine the approach taken by American courts to resolving
the identical problems that arose under a very similar legal instrument,
particularly because traces of the American approach are still found in
recent Canadian cases.

23. Canadian Superior Oil Ltd v Paddon-Hughes Development Co Ltd (1969), 3 DLR
(3d) 10 at 19 (Alta SC (AD)).
24. David R Percy, “The Law of Restitution and the Unexpected Termination of
Petroleum and Natural Gas Leases” (1988) 27:1 Alta L Rev 105.
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1. American Cases on Failed Leases
The similarity between original Canadian freehold petroleum leases and
their American counterparts meant that the American leases often failed for
the same reasons. At the time of the first phase of Canadian cases, the
American courts had already developed a great deal of experience in
resolving the problems that were only beginning to emerge in Canada.
The American approach is simple in principle and is applied with
considerable consistency. It is exemplified in the well-known case of
Champlin Refining Co v Aladdin Petroleum Corp, 25 in which Champlin
Refining Co (Champlin) had purchased two leases from the state of
Oklahoma, apparently without any warranty of title. It drilled two wells on
the leased lands at a cost of more than $157,000 and produced oil and gas
from those wells for a considerable period of time. Champlin then
discovered that it had no right to the lands in question and surrendered the
lease and the producing wells to the rightful owners. Champlin also paid the
rightful owners an amount of more than $310,000, which represented the
market value of all production taken from the wells, less the expenses of
drilling, developing, and operating the wells (which totaled approximately
$197,000). Still dissatisfied, the rightful owners brought action for the total
value of all the oil and gas that Champlin had produced from the lands. The
Supreme Court of Oklahoma found that Champlin was mistaken in its view
of the true ownership of the land and that it had unquestionably acted in
good faith, in the belief that its leases were valid, when it drilled the wells
and brought them into production. The Court awarded damages for the
petroleum and natural gas that Champlin had produced on the basis of the
value of the oil at the time of production, less the reasonable costs of
production. Champlin’s belief that it held all the required rights to the
leased lands meant that it was a good faith trespasser, and it was only
required to pay the net proceeds of production to the rightful owners. In
contrast, if the Court had found that Champlin was a bad faith trespasser, it
would have been required to disgorge all the proceeds of production from
the lands in question.
Two features of the American case law are notable in the light of
developments in Canada. First, as the Champlin case illustrates, the good
faith trespasser will recover the reasonable costs of producing petroleum
substances from the leased lands, or their actual costs if they are lower than
the reasonable costs. If an efficient trespasser succeeded in bringing a well

25. 238 P.2d 827 (Okla. 1951) [Champlin].
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into production at a cost that was lower than the prevailing market rates, it
would recover only its actual expenses. On the other hand, any unnecessary
costs incurred by the trespasser will not be recovered. This distinction
emphasizes that the purpose of allowing a mistaken producer to recover its
costs is clearly to prevent what would otherwise have amounted to an unjust
enrichment of the lawful owner at the expense of the trespasser.26
Second, although most American cases have concluded that the
trespasser acted in good faith,27 the threshold for finding that a trespass was
committed in bad faith is not as high as the Canadian cases suggest. One of
the most widely quoted definitions states:
[T]he defendant must have an honest belief in the superiority of
his right or title, and such belief must be a reasonable one in the
light of the circumstances. The test is subjective in that he must
have actual notice of the outstanding paramount right, and
constructive notice is not sufficient. The test is objective in that
he must not have acted with culpable negligence or with wilful
disregard for the rights of others, and in that his belief in the
superiority of his claim must be reasonable. 28
The application of this principle is less strict than the definition implies.
Most states placed the onus of proving good faith on the trespasser. A
number of jurisdictions have found that the company acts in bad faith if it
chooses to drill a well with the knowledge that there is an actual or pending
claim over the validity of its rights. This approach has been extended to
cases in which a company proceeded to production after a decision that the
competing claim was invalid, but before a final appeal was heard. 29 There is
little doubt that the facts in some of the recent Canadian cases suggest that
an argument of bad faith trespass might have been open to the lessor.30

26. John S Lowe, Oil and Gas Law in a Nutshell, 5th ed (St Paul, MN: Thomson
Reuters, 2009) at 58.
27. Ibid.
28. Eugene Kuntz, A Treatise on the Law of Oil and Gas (Cincinnati: Anderson, 1987)
vol 1 at 315–16 [footnotes omitted].
29. Shell Oil Co v Manley Oil Corp, 50 F. Supp. 21 (E.D. Ill. 1942).
30. See particularly Xerex Exploration Ltd v Petro-Canada, 2005 ABCA 224, 367 AR
201 [Xerex], discussed in Part III.C of this article and the argument in Bankes,
“Termination,” supra note 19 at 61–63.
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2. The Approach of Canadian Courts in Phase One
In the first phase of Canadian case law, three cases confronted the
problem of accounting for the proceeds of production after the failure of a
lease. None of the cases offer any analysis of the problem and the list of
authorities cited suggests that the relevant arguments were not before the
courts. The results of the cases can be placed on a spectrum. At one end, the
court ignored the production that had occurred, and at the other, the court
reached the conclusion that would have been appropriate only if the
trespass had occurred in bad faith. In the middle of the spectrum, the only
Supreme Court of Canada decision reached a result that is broadly
consistent with the American cases of good faith trespass.
All three cases in the first phase involved the problem identified in the
Kininmonth decision, where the lessee commenced a well within the
primary term but failed to achieve production prior to its expiry. 31 The
cases uniformly found that this type of lease expired at the end of the
primary term unless a well was actually in production at that time. 32 It is a
rarely discussed feature of the Kininmonth case that it also raised the
question of the fate of the proceeds of production under the invalid lease. In
that case, the lessee had produced oil from the well for a period of
approximately 11 days after the lease expired.33 The lessor sought only a
declaration that the lease had terminated and was successful on this point.
He made no claim to the proceeds of production. Probably for this reason,
and because of the short duration of the production, the Court did not deal
with the proceeds of production in its reasons for judgment. It may be
presumed that they remained in the hands of the lessee.
Paramount Petroleum and Mineral Corporation Ltd v Imperial Oil Ltd
dealt with a problem that was identical to that which arose in Kininmonth,
with the exception that the lessee continued the production of large volumes
of oil for many years after the lease expired. 34 The Court found that the
lessee was unaware of the nature of its rights until long after it brought the
31. Supra note 4.
32. This type of clause also explains the decision in Republic Resources, supra note 22
(see Part II.A of this article).
33. Kininmonth, supra note 4 at 440.
34. (1970), 73 WWR 417 (Sask QB) at 425 [Paramount]: The lessee held two leases
covering one and a half sections of land. The Court found that only the lease covering a half
section of land was invalid. By the time of the trial, the decision indicates that the well on
the land included in the terminated lease had been in production for nearly 11 years and that
the lessee had paid almost $77,000 in royalties in respect of the entire one and a half
sections.
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well into production. There is thus no doubt that the lessee was, in
American terminology, a good faith trespasser, but nevertheless, the Court
ordered an accounting “with respect to all oil, gas and other mineral
substances taken from the said lands,” 35 just as if the lessee had been a bad
faith trespasser.
Long after the first phase of the development of Canadian law, the
Manitoba Court of Appeal reached the same result as the Paramount
decision in 1993. In Hill Estate v Chevron Standard Ltd, 36 Chevron
Standard Ltd (Chevron) entered into a mineral lease with the wife of the
mineral owner, who was acting under a power of attorney granted by her
husband in 1978. Some four years later, both the mineral owner and his
wife had died and Chevron notified the owner’s estate that was about to
commence drilling under its lease. The lawyer for the estate told Chevron
that the power of attorney was invalid, because of the mental incapacity of
the owner at the time it was granted, and that the lease was therefore void.
Nevertheless, Chevron proceeded to drill a successful well and begin
production.
The case was unusual. The Court decided that the lease was invalid, but
then invited further argument on the consequences of that decision.37 The
Court recognized that Chevron’s actions in drilling the well had enriched
the estate. However, it found that the estate was entitled to all the revenue
generated by the sale of oil from the mineral estate, without any deduction
for the costs of drilling or marketing the product. Under the traditional
approach, this result could have been justified by classifying Chevron as a
bad faith trespasser because of its decision to drill a well when it knew the
lease might be void. However, the Court declined to pursue this reasoning
and commented that equity would not “afford protection to a trespasser.” 38
In drilling a well without valid legal authority, Chevron had provided a
juristic reason for the enrichment.
It is difficult to justify the decision to award the estate all the proceeds of
production on this basis. The result is contrary to a 1971 decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada, described in the following paragraph, and
35. Ibid at 434. John Ballem reported anecdotally that in the accounting that followed
the decision in Paramount, the parties allowed the lessee to deduct the cost of drilling and
completing the well. Supra note 1 at 386.
36. (1992), [1993] 2 WWR 545 (Man CA).
37. Ibid at 569.
38. Ibid at 561. The reference to equity is probably explained because Chevron argued
the case for recovering its costs on the basis of a constructive trust. However, there appeared
to be no need for a proprietary, rather than a personal remedy, in restitution.
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proved to be completely inconsistent with the direction adopted by the
courts in the following decade, as described in Part III of this article.
Only the last of the first phase of Canadian cases gave an explicit
indication that the lessee could retain some of the proceeds of production
that had occurred after the lease was terminated. In Sohio Petroleum Co v
Weyburn Security Co Ltd, 39 Sohio Petroleum Co (Sohio) began production
of oil some six weeks after the end of the lease and production continued
for almost seven years before the lease was challenged. The lessor was
successful in its action to require the lessee to vacate the land, but also
sought an accounting for the value of all the oil produced from the leased
lands. The accounting issue was dealt with only in the final substantive
paragraph of the decision in the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal. It stated:
The respondent also sought an accounting of all petroleum,
natural gas and related hydrocarbons removed from the land by
the appellants, or damages in lieu thereof. The court has
jurisdiction to grant this relief on terms which will be just and
equitable to all parties involved. The appellant Sohio proceeded
under a mistake as to its rights, and did not knowingly take an
unfair advantage of the respondent’s lack of appreciation of its
legal rights. The appellants were first aware that their position
was challenged when the writ of summons was served upon
them. At that time the revenue which they had received from the
sale of the production exceeded the amount they had expended.
Under the circumstances, it would appear just and equitable to
order the appellants to account for all benefits from production
received by them after the date of service of the writ of summons
upon them. 40
The case offers no explanation for this conclusion, other than the
principle of justice and equity. As will be seen in the following section,
recent case law has correctly identified this brief passage as central to
Canadian law dealing with the proceeds of production. As a result, it has
been subject to close scrutiny, but it has also been used to justify some
surprising conclusions. It is therefore initially important to assess the
probable meaning of the passage in the context of the Sohio decision. The
statement is noteworthy in three respects. First, there is no indication that
there was any significant argument on the question of whether the lessor
39. [1971] SCR 81, aff’g (1969), 7 DLR (3d) 277 (Sask CA) [Sohio].
40. Ibid at 89.
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should receive the proceeds of production. The reasons for judgment at all
three levels cite no relevant authority on this question, and they are
concerned almost entirely with the termination of the lease and the defence
of estoppel. Second, the paragraph clearly establishes that the lessee was an
innocent trespasser. Third, when faced with the lessor’s claim to all the
proceeds of production, the Court expresses a concern that Sohio should, at
a minimum, recover its costs of production. Although the exhibits filed at
trial in the Sohio case apparently contain details of Sohio’s production,41
there is no indication that there was any detailed evidence on this point. The
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal appeared to allow Sohio to retain the
revenue as of the commencement of the action as a rough and ready
formula to ensure that it had covered its costs.
It must be conceded that the meaning of the vital paragraph in the Sohio
case is far from self-evident. The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal recently
asserted that this shows that the Court adopted a just and equitable approach
to the assessment of damages. 42 However, the simplest explanation of both
the reasoning and the result may well be that the Court instinctively applied
the good faith trespasser rule. It is quite possible that the reference to the
“just and equitable” nature of the order merely reflects the recognition that
it would be wrong to allow the lessor to recover all the proceeds of
production without bearing any of the costs. There is some support for this
interpretation in the Supreme Court of Canada decision. Although the Court
was content to reiterate the final paragraph of the judgment of the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal, set out above, unlike the Court of Appeal, it
first noted that the lessor’s claim for an accounting of all production after
the lease had terminated was “subject to an allowance for expenses incurred
by the appellants.” 43 The decision seems to adopt a formula which ensured
that Sohio recovered its expenses of production. Admittedly, on this view,
Sohio should not have been allowed to retain any amount in excess of its
actual expenditures if the evidence permitted this calculation to be made.
However, as a matter of principle, the Supreme Court decision suggests that
the amount retained by the lessee should not be determined by broad
principles of justice and equity, but by an examination of the extent to
which the lessor would otherwise be enriched by the innocent, but
41. See Montreal Trust Co v Williston Wildcatters Corp, 2004 SKCA 116, 254 Sask R
38 at paras 96–99 [Williston Wildcatters (Remedies)].
42. Ibid at para 96.
43. Sohio, supra note 39 at 89. Contrary to the assertion in Williston Wildcatters
(Remedies), ibid, the reference to the lessor’s claim for the net proceeds of production did
not appear in the Court of Appeal decision.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol3/iss2/7

2017]

Overlapping Remedies

495

mistaken, actions of the lessee. The case can thus readily be seen as an
application of the principle applied in Champlin, but without an exact
assessment of the expenditures incurred by the lessee.
III. Lease Failure in the New Millennium
A. The Compensatory Approach
The cases involving the unexpected termination of leases decided within
the last decade take a radically different view of the position of the lessee.
While the earlier cases, with the single exception of the Sohio decision, did
not allow the lessee to obtain any compensation when a lease failed, the
new wave of authority takes a markedly different approach. In each of the
modern cases, the lessee was entitled to retain revenue from the failed lease
at a level that could have considerably exceeded its costs of production.
The point of departure of the recent cases arises in part from framing the
claim to damages upon the failure of a lease in the law of torts, because the
lessee commits trespass by remaining on the lands after the termination of
the lease. Nigel Bankes has cast doubt on this analysis by pointing out that
under a conventional lease, a tenant who continues in possession at the end
of the term of the lease without the landlord’s dissent or assent does not
commit trespass. He suggests that the proper cause of action in cases
involving the oil and gas lease may lie in conversion.44 However, the
Alberta Court of Appeal has correctly pointed out that there is a question of
whether the holder of an interest in minerals has a sufficiently immediate
right to the possession of substances not yet severed from the ground to
support a conversion action. 45 It is surely certain that an energy company
which extracts resources from land owned by another person without a
valid lease is violating a property right of that person. It is not necessary to
resolve this debate for the purpose of contrasting the tortious approach to
calculating damages, where the objective is placing the lessor in the
position it would have occupied if the tort had not been committed, with the
restitutionary approach of focusing on the extent to which the lessee has
been enriched as a result of the wrong. However, it must be noted that the
majority of Canadian cases treat the continued occupation of land after the
44. Bankes, “Termination,” supra note 19 at 52–55. Even though overholding tenants in
a conventional lease may not commit trespass, they remain liable to a claim for the use and
occupation of premises that is based on restitutionary principles as set out in Part IV.C of
this article. See also Robert Megarry & William Wade, The Law of Real Property, 7th ed
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008) at 773.
45. Xerex, supra note 30 at 243–44.
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termination of a mineral lease as trespass, and it is not obvious why the
approach that courts have taken in the case of conventional leases should be
extended to the profit à prendre created by a mineral lease.
The compensatory approach was initially developed by the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal and subsequently embraced by the Alberta
Court of Queen’s Bench in two of the leading cases of the past decade. In
each case, the litigation was protracted and involved numerous judicial
decisions. In Williston Wildcatters, 46 which was described in Part I.E of this
article, the lease failed in 1990 because, after 35 years of production, there
was an extended period during which neither production nor operations
occurred on the leased lands. The lessee continued to conduct activities on
the leased lands without realizing that the lease had terminated, and
ultimately brought the well back into production. In 1993 the lessor
commenced an action in which it successfully challenged the validity of the
lease and sought to recover the market value of all the oil taken from the
leased lands after the lease had terminated.
The dispute in Freyberg also involved separate hearings on the validity
of the lease and the remedies available to the lessor. Although the Alberta
Court of Appeal found that the lessee’s decision in 1978 to shut in the well
was initially valid, it concluded that at some point before 1999 an economic
market for gas existed and the lease had lapsed at that time. 47 However, in
1999 neither party was aware that the lease had terminated. The lessee
brought the well into production in December 1999, and production
continued until February 2006. 48 In the hearing that dealt with the remedies
in this case, the lessor sought to recover the gain that the lessee had
received during the entire period of production, in an amount exceeding
$4.8 million. 49
Both cases recognized that there were two possible approaches to
compensating the lessor. The Courts described the restitutionary approach
as resting on the theory that “a wrongdoer should not profit from his
wrong” by removing “any benefit or gain from the hands of the defendant
wrongdoer.” 50 They treated the measurement of the actual recovery from
the wrongdoer in restitution through a variation of the formula that
46. Supra note 11 at paras 14–22.
47. Supra note 7 at para 137. Leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada on the
termination issue was refused (2005), 363 AR 35.
48. Freyberg v Fletcher Challenge Oil and Gas Inc, 2007 ABQB 353, 428 AR 102 at
para 11 [Freyberg (Remedies)].
49. Ibid at para 92.
50. Ibid at para 98.
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examines the state of mind of the trespasser. In the case of bad faith
trespass, the lessor will receive the value of the oil or gas, with a deduction
only for the costs of transporting the substances to market. In the case of
innocent trespass, the wrongdoer is entitled to deduct the costs of
“severance, production and marketing.” 51
Both cases refused to apply either version of the so-called restitutionary
approach. Instead, they adopted a tortious measure of compensation with
the objective of placing the lessor in the position it would have occupied if
the wrong had not occurred. 52 On the facts of each case, the Courts felt that
the innocent trespass rule would have overcompensated the lessor through
an award that exceeded the amount which could ever have been received
from the exploitation of the minerals.
The possibility of overcompensation arose from the nature of each lessor.
In Williston Wildcatters, Montreal Trust Company (Montreal Trust) held
the lease as a bare trustee. Under the terms of the trust agreement, it had no
right to produce oil and gas from the leased lands, and if it had known that
the lease had lapsed, it would have had no choice but to engage a third party
to carry on production. The plaintiff in Freyberg had no similar restrictions
on her legal capacity, but she had not had any significant involvement in
business throughout her life and the Court found that she could not have
operated the well by herself. Once the original lease was terminated she,
like Montreal Trust, would have been required to enter a new lease
arrangement with a different operator. In the Courts’ view, neither plaintiff
would ever have been in the position to earn the net proceeds of production
and would thus have received a windfall from an award based in restitution.
In contrast, an award based on tort principles fully compensated the
plaintiffs by examining the bonus and royalty arrangements that they would
have been able to negotiate at the time the lease terminated. In Freyberg,
the Court found in principle that the plaintiff would have received a bonus
payment and royalty rate significantly higher than the industry norm
because the existence of a proven well meant that the lessee would not have
to bear the normal risk of drilling a well that might have been
unsuccessful. 53 In Williston Wildcatters, the Court had sufficient evidence
51. Ibid at para 99.
52. Ibid at para 100; Williston Wildcatters (Remedies), supra note 41 at paras 110–11.
53. Freyberg (Remedies), ibid at para 141. The Court required further evidence to
establish the plaintiff’s actual loss, but the case was subsequently settled. See Chris Simard,
David Holub & Larina Taylor, “Lady Freyberg: Examples of How Contemporary Courts in
Alberta Approach the Modern Business Realities of the Freehold Petroleum and Natural Gas
Lease” (2009) 46:2 Alta L Rev 299.
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to quantify the damages. It concluded that, when the original lease
terminated, the lessor would have been able to obtain a bonus of $6,400 for
signing a new lease and a royalty rate of 18 percent, rather than the 12.5
percent stipulated in the original lease. 54
Both decisions raised novel points in oil and gas law in Canada. They
can best be understood by examining their historical sources and their
impact on future decisions.
B. Historical Antecedents
Although none of the earlier cases in Canadian oil and gas law had
explicitly taken a compensatory approach to calculating the loss suffered by
the lessor, it is important to note that Williston Wildcatters and Freyberg
did not come as bolts from the blue. Both cases relied on an established
common law line of authority in mining law, and in particular, on the wellknown decision in Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co. 55 Livingstone had
purchased approximately 1.5 acres of land, on which 30 miners’ cottages
were located, in the middle of a coalfield leased to the respondents. Both
Livingstone and the vendors thought that he had purchased only the surface
of the land and that the vendors had reserved the property in all the coal
beneath the surface. Acting on this belief, the respondents, in the course of
extracting coal from the surrounding lands, also removed 5,895 tons of coal
from beneath Livingstone’s 1.5 acre parcel. They acted in “perfect
ignorance” and with “no bad faith, nor sinister intention” 56 in removing the
coal from Livingstone’s land. When the mining operations were completed
and all the coal had been sold, Livingstone discovered that the original
conveyance had inadvertently transferred to him the property in the coal
beneath his land.
Livingstone sought the value of all the coal removed from his land, with
an allowance for the costs incurred by the respondents in bringing the coal
to the surface. This formula would have yielded approximately £515.
However, there were two obstacles to this claim. First, Livingstone could
not have mined the coal profitably on his own because of the very small
parcel of land which he owned. The only practical method by which he
could have obtained value for the coal was by arranging for the respondents
to remove his coal in the course of their own operations. Second, his own
witnesses stated that they would have advised him to sell his coal subject to
54. Williston Wildcatters, supra note 11 at para 49, aff’d Williston Wildcatters
(Remedies), supra note 41 at paras 17, 112–15.
55. (1880) 5 AC 25 (HL (Scot)) [Livingstone].
56. Ibid at 26.
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a royalty that would yield approximately £171 and to recover the cost of
repairing damages to his houses caused by subsidence from the mining
operations. On this basis, the House of Lords affirmed the award of £200
damages to Livingstone. 57
Livingstone provides a direct link in the lineage of the recent cases in
Western Canada. The insistence by the House of Lords on calculating
Livingstone’s loss on a compensatory measure where he could not
economically or practically have developed the coal on his own explains
the adoption of the same approach where the Courts found that the lessees
did not have the legal capacity, in Williston Wildcatters, or the business
acumen, in Freyberg, to exploit their own resources. The cases have thus
undoubtedly established in Canada an alternative analysis of remedies in
the case of a terminated lease. The following section will examine the
impact of the alternative analysis in two subsequent decisions.
C. The Extension of the Compensatory Approach
The adoption of a compensatory approach to damages by the
Saskatchewan Court of Appeal was bound to have an effect on subsequent
oil and gas litigation. The extent of the potential impact of the difference
between the compensatory and the restitutionary approaches was illustrated
almost immediately in a complex case of trespass that arose from Alberta’s
practice of allocating petroleum and natural gas rights in limited geological
strata. In Xerex Exploration Ltd v Petro-Canada, 58 the Crown had granted
the shallow petroleum and natural gas rights to the base of the BlueskyBullhead formations to the appellant. Xerex Exploration Ltd (Xerex) held
the deep rights beneath those formations. The appellant obtained a licence
to drill the 1-1 Well in order to explore its rights and the regulator permitted
it to continue to drill a further 15 metres below the base of the BlueskyBullhead formations. This extension, known as the “over-hole,” was
granted for the sole purpose of accommodating the appellant’s logging tools
and casing. 59 When the appellant drilled the over-hole, it penetrated the
deep zone, where Xerex held the mineral rights. Despite the limited
purposes of the permission to drill the extension of the well, the appellant
took the opportunity of taking drill cutting samples at one metre intervals in
the over-hole. The samples showed promising signs of the presence of oil in
the deep zone.
57. Ibid at 32–33.
58. Supra note 30.
59. Ibid at para 15.
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The appellant immediately began negotiations to acquire the rights to the
deep zone from Xerex. During the negotiations, Xerex asked whether the
appellant had drilled into the deep zone. The appellant fraudulently
misrepresented that it had not done so and failed to disclose that it had
drilled a further seven metres into the deep zone and taken more samples in
the days following the beginning of negotiations. As a result of the
negotiations, in November 1996, Xerex sold its rights to the deep zone in
exchange for a gross overriding royalty of 3 percent on any production
obtained by the appellant.60
About 18 months after acquiring Xerex’s rights to the deep zone, the
appellant sold a number of properties, including the 1-1 Well, to another
company for the price of approximately $1.4 million. 61 In the spring of
1999, Xerex learned by chance that the 1-1 Well had proved to be very
productive. The discovery was particularly surprising, as Xerex had not
received any royalties from the production, and it commenced proceedings
against both the appellant and the new owner of the 1-1 Well. By the time
of the trial, the net revenue for the 1-1 Well exceeded $3.5 million and its
future net cash flow was estimated at almost $12.7 million.62
Two facts in particular militated against Xerex recovering the proceeds
of the production from its deep rights in this case. Although Xerex was an
oil company, it was far from certain that it would have been able to exploit
its deep rights in the absence of the appellant’s intervention. When the
appellant began negotiations to acquire the rights to the deep zone, Xerex’s
rights were due to expire unless it fulfilled the demanding requirement of
drilling a potentially productive well within 20 days. Second, in hindsight,
the appellant had made a bad decision in selling the very valuable 1-1 Well
and other properties for $ 1.4 million. The difference between the selling
price of the entire group of properties and the value of the ultimate
production of the 1-1 Well meant that a remedy based on the extent by
which the appellant had been enriched by its wrongdoing was much less
attractive than a compensatory remedy. As a result, Xerex sought damages
to place the company in the position it would have occupied if it had been
properly informed of the appellant’s drilling activities in the deep zone. The
Alberta Court of Appeal affirmed the decision of the trial judge that, in the
absence of the appellant’s misrepresentation and failure to disclose the
extent of its drilling into the deep zone, Xerex would have negotiated a

60. Ibid at paras 24–25.
61. Ibid at para 29.
62. Ibid at para 33.
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farm-out agreement entitling it to 50 percent of the net profits of the 1-1
Well, which were quantified at more than $8.1 million.63
It is necessary to make only a slight change to the facts of this case in
order to demonstrate the potentially dramatic difference between the
compensatory and restitutionary approaches. If the appellant had retained
ownership of the 1-1 Well and had contacted Xerex further in advance of
the termination of its rights, so that Xerex might have been able to drill its
own well in the deep zone, an interesting array of possibilities would have
arisen. The appellant’s conduct would almost certainly have been classified
as a bad faith trespass, and thus Xerex would have recovered all of the
proceeds of production (under the American approach) or the proceeds of
production minus the costs of transporting the oil to market (as suggested in
Williston Wildcatters). Even if the appellant’s trespass had been classified
as innocent, Xerex would presumably have been able to show that it could
have produced oil from the deep rights on its own and recovered the net
proceeds of production in the amount of $16.26 million. 64
A more traditional approach was adopted at the Canpar Holdings trial.
As indicated in Part I.F of this article, the trial judge found that a gas lease
had terminated through the lessee’s wrongful calculation of royalties and
failure to respond to a subsequent notice of default. The Court then
addressed the problem of fashioning the appropriate remedy for the gas that
the lessee had produced after the date of termination. It noted that the Court
in Freyberg had adopted the compensatory principle for the award of
damages and that, in the present case, the lessee’s conduct was “far less
egregious” 65 than that of the defendant in Freyberg. This comment might
suggest an inclination to award a remedy which was at least as mild as that
awarded in Freyberg, but the Court then granted the lessor a remedy based
on the proceeds of production after the termination of the lease, minus
transportation costs. There was no explanation for this result in the original
oral judgment, although in clarifying the reasons, the trial judge noted that
the lessors could have produced from the wells themselves, thus
distinguishing the actual calculation of damages from Freyberg. 66
63. Ibid at para 94.
64. The trial judge in the Xerex decision found that the past and future net profit from
the 1-1 Well was $ 16,266,000, ibid. The Court of Appeal decision suggested an alternative
avenue to this result by finding that the appellant was in a fiduciary relationship with Xerex,
thus rendering the appellant liable to account to Xerex for its profit. See Maddaugh &
McCamus, supra note 18 at 828–29.
65. Canpar Holdings trial, supra note 14 at 7.
66. Ibid at 8.
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The Alberta Court of Appeal’s decision to relieve against the forfeiture
of the gas lease avoided the necessity of discussing the applicable principles
of damages, although the Court did note that the trial decision had created a
windfall by requiring the lessee to pay both the net proceeds of production
and the royalty at the rate prescribed in the lease.67
The facts of the Xerex case seem to illustrate the potentially large
differences that can occur under the so-called restitutionary approach and
the compensatory approach adopted in Williston Wildcatters and Freyberg.
The award of damages at trial in Canpar Holdings suggests that there is a
degree of confusion in the application of the new approach. The following
section will attempt to disentangle the conflicting principles that are now
found in Canadian case law.
IV. A Principled Approach to Overlapping Remedies
A. Criticism of the New Approach
The new approach to the question of compensation upon the unexpected
termination of a lease drew severe criticism from distinguished authors.
Both John Ballem and Nigel Bankes delivered strong attacks on the
decisions on the basis of four major objections, each of which will be
considered in turn.
1. Inconsistency with Other Authorities in Natural Resources Law
Perhaps the primary critique of the new approach articulated in Williston
Wildcatters and Freyberg is that it represents a significant departure from
the way that the courts have determined a proper remedy in cases that
involve the wrongful severance of natural resources. Bankes argues that the
vast majority of such cases are restitutionary in nature and that the
corresponding remedies are best understood as falling within one of three
categories: (1) allowing the lessee no deductions for the costs associated
with severance; (2) allowing the lessee to deduct post-severance costs only;
and (3) allowing the lessee to deduct pre- and post-severance costs. 68
In analyzing the compensatory approach that was taken in Williston
Wildcatters and Freyberg, which Professor Bankes refers to as the “costsplus approach,” he suggests that the House of Lords in Livingstone 69 did not
intend to develop a mild compensatory rule of broad application in the way

67. Canpar Holdings, supra note 17 at para 56.
68. Bankes, “Termination,” supra note 19 at 57, 63–77.
69. See Part III.B of this article.
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that the recent cases suggest.70 Rather, the Court emphasized that the facts
in Livingstone were peculiar (that is, well outside of the norm) and gave rise
to a compensatory measure of damages on the particular facts of the case.
Bankes quotes Lord Blackburn who stated in Livingstone:
My Lords, I wish only to say one word to guard against any
misapprehension on a point which I at first a little
misapprehended. I do not think that this decision of the Court of
Session is that the royalty is the measure of damages. It is only
that it is evidence of the value which is the measure of the
damages. 71
Bankes thus argues that the bulk of the authority on wrongful severance
supports a restitutionary approach and that the compensatory approach that
has been so prominent in recent Canadian cases was meant to be narrowly
confined.
2. Failure to Ensure that Tortfeasors Should Not Profit from their
Wrongs
Although the general approach to damages in tort is based upon the
compensation principle and is designed to restore the plaintiff to the
position it would have occupied if the wrong had not occurred, a competing
principle in the context of wrongful severance of natural resources is that
tortfeasors should not benefit from their wrongs. 72 The decision in AG v
Blake 73 is particularly informative in this regard. Blake, though concerned
with a breach of contract, provided an important caveat to the standard
compensatory approach when Lord Nicholls stated:
Damages are measured by the plaintiffs loss, not the defendant’s
gain. But the common law, pragmatic as ever, has long
recognised that there are many commonplace situations where a
strict application this principle would not do justice between the
parties. Then compensation for the wrong done to the plaintiff is
measured by a different yardstick. A trespasser who enters
another’s land may cause the landowner no financial loss. In
such a case damages are measured by the benefit received by the
70. Bankes, “Termination,” supra note 19 at 68–69.
71. Ibid at 69, citing Livingstone, supra note 55 at 42–43 [emphasis in Bankes,
“Termination”].
72. Ibid at 75.
73. [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL (Eng)) [Blake].
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trespasser, namely, by his use of the land. The same principle is
applied where the wrong consists of use of another’s land for
depositing waste, or by using a path across the land or using
passages in an underground mine. In this type of case the
damages recoverable will be, in short, the price a reasonable
person would pay for the right of user.
...
In some instances the common law itself afforded a wronged
party a choice of remedies. A notable example is the wrong of
conversion. A person whose goods were wrongfully converted
by another had a choice of two remedies against the wrongdoer.
He could recover damages, in respect of the loss he had
sustained by the conversion. Or he could recover the proceeds of
the conversion obtained by the defendant. 74
In effect it is argued that the compensatory approach fails to give
sufficient weight to a significant body of authority that allows for a plaintiff
to make a restitutionary or gains-based claim so as to prevent the tortfeasor
from profiting from its wrong.
3. Failure to Respect the Property Rights of the Lessor
A third line of criticism argues that the compensatory approach
diminishes the protection provided to the property rights of the lessor. In
determining whether to apply the restitutionary or the compensatory
approach, the courts must inquire into whether the lessor could or would
have produced the mineral estate on its own. The late John Ballem noted
that this “requires the court to delve into the affairs of the plaintiff, a task
for which it is ill-equipped.” 75
The argument continues that the distinction invariably results in some
lessors being more “equal” than others. In cases involving continued
production after a lease has failed, lessors who are sophisticated
commercial oil and gas producers are more likely to receive significant
damages than individual lessors who are unable to demonstrate that they
could have produced their minerals on their own.76

74. Ibid at 278–80 [citations omitted].
75. John Bishop Ballem, “The Further Adventures and Strange Afterlife of the Oil and
Gas Lease” (2006) 44:2 Alta L Rev 429 at 438.
76. Ibid.
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4. Lack of Incentive to Discontinue Production Under a Challenged
Lease
As illustrated in Williston Wildcatters and Freyberg, the compensatory
approach can result in the wrongdoer paying damages in the form of a
bonus payment and an increased royalty rate. This creates the risk that an
overholding lessee may look at the minor potential financial consequences
of continuing to produce and decide, from a business perspective, that it is
worth the risk. As Ballem pointed out:
If the bonus consideration and the royalty rate happened to be
the same as were commonly obtained at the time the lease
terminated, it would appear that the mineral owner would not be
entitled to any compensation whatsoever. This despite the fact
that the lessee had enjoyed revenue from the production of
minerals to which it had no legal title.77
This could tempt the overholding lessee to continue in possession of the
leased lands and obtain production revenues while participating in a
protracted legal battle over the validity of the underlying lease, especially
if, as recent case law suggests, this conduct would not be seen as acting in
bad faith but merely an example of a lessee acting upon its view of its legal
rights. 78
The likelihood that there will be more decisions on the impact of
unexpectedly terminated leases requires an analysis of the extent to which
these criticisms are justified and an examination of whether the gulf
between the compensatory and restitutionary approaches is as great as the
authors suggest. From the viewpoint of principle and certainty, the accounts
of the evolution of the compensatory principle in Canada creates two major
issues, which will be considered in turn.
B. When is a Restitutionary Remedy Available?
The first issue occurs as a result of the approach to the problems that
arise when the plaintiff has a choice of overlapping remedies, each of which
may create a different measure of damages. In Williston Wildcatters, the
lessor disputed the trial judge’s damage assessment based on compensation
instead of restitution and claimed the full value of its minerals, less the
costs of production and marketing, in order to prevent the original lessee

77. Ibid.
78. Ibid.
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from profiting from its wrongdoing. 79 The Court appeared to reject the
restitutionary approach and applied the compensatory principle which, in its
view, “derives from equity and has as its goal doing justice and equity
between all the parties on the facts.”80 The Court in Freyberg saw a stark
choice between the two approaches and firmly applied the compensatory
principle of tort law in order to avoid conferring a windfall on the lessor. In
essence both Courts rejected the lessor’s claim in restitution because they
felt that its result would be excessively generous and that it should be
ignored on the grounds of justice and equity.
The denial of the restitutionary remedy on these grounds is both
alarming and contrary to the normal approach when overlapping remedies
are available in a particular case. In essence, it treats restitution as a guide
to the quantification of damages, rather than an independent cause of
action. In principle, plaintiffs who establish the elements of an action in
unjust enrichment are entitled to a restitutionary remedy and the courts have
no business in substituting a tort remedy on the grounds that it seems fairer.
As Justice La Forest stated:
[A] claim for an unjust enrichment, is concerned with giving
back to someone something that has been taken from them (a
restitutionary proprietary award) or its equivalent value (a
personal restitutionary award) . . . [the function] “is to ensure
that where a plaintiff has been deprived of wealth that is either in
his possession or would have accrued for his benefit, it is
restored to him. The measure of restitutionary recovery is the
gain the [defendant] made at the [plaintiffs] expense.’’ 81
The claims of the lessors in both Williston Wildcatters and Freyberg
have a firm historical foundation in an area of restitution that was formerly
(and misleadingly) known as “waiver of tort.” The underlying principle of
the cases in this area was that the plaintiff gave up the right to sue in tort
and instead elected “to base the claim in restitution, thereby seeking to
recoup the benefits that the defendant has derived from the tortious
conduct.” 82 Indeed, conversion and trespass provide some of the most

79. Williston Wildcatters (Remedies), supra note 41 at para 69.
80. Ibid at para 110.
81. Citadel General Assurance Co v Lloyds Bank Canada, [1997] 3 SCR 805 at para 30
[Citadel General Assurance], citing Air Canada v British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 1161 at
1202–03.
82. Maddaugh & McCamus, supra note 18 at 727.
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familiar examples of recovery under this heading. 83 They are now
understood as examples of restitution for wrongdoing 84 and reflect the
general principle that a defendant may be required to restore the value of a
benefit that was gained not just from a tort, but from any type of
wrongdoing. The action is initially triggered by the occurrence of a wrong,
although its purpose is to prevent the defendant from being unjustly
enriched through wrongdoing.
In cases such as Williston Wildcatters and Freyberg, the plaintiffs
fulfilled the requirements of actions in both tort and restitution. A broadly
analogous problem arose in a series of Canadian cases in which the courts
confronted cases where the defendant’s conduct created both a breach of
contract and a tort. At first, the courts had difficulty with the existence of
overlapping remedies, each of which were subject to different rules and
measures of damages. Famously, Justice Pigeon once proclaimed in the
Supreme Court of Canada that “the basis of tort liability considered in
Hedley Byrne is inapplicable to any case where the relationship between the
parties is governed by a contract, unless the negligence relied on can
properly be considered as an ‘independent tort’ unconnected with the
performance of that contract.”85 It took more than a decade for the courts to
recognize that the same set of facts could create concurrent liability in
contract and tort, unless a contractual provision excluded or limited the tort
action. The general principle allowed the plaintiff “to assert the cause of
action that appears to be most advantageous to him in respect of any
particular legal consequence.” 86
There can surely be no argument that prevents this principle from
applying where the same set of facts fulfills the requirements of an action in
tort and an action in restitution. The plaintiff must be able to assert the most
advantageous cause of action available in the particular case and a court
cannot rule out either action on the flimsy ground that its result may be
unjust or inequitable. Any suggestion to that effect in Williston Wildcatters
or Freyberg must be wrong. In the view of the authors, it is correct to say
that the plaintiff may choose to pursue a remedy in restitution when the
83. James Edelman, Cain-Based Damages: Contract, Tort, Equity and Intellectual
Property (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2002) at 123, 137–40.
84. Kingstreet Investments Ltd v New Brunswick, 2007 SCC 1, [2007] 1 SCR 3 at para
33. The Supreme Court of Canada recognized that “[t]here are at least two distinct categories
of restitution: (1) restitution for wrongdoing; and (2) restitution for unjust enrichment.”
85. J Nunes Diamonds Ltd v Dominion Electric Protection Co, [1972] SCR 769 at 777–
78, citing Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller & Partners Ltd, [1964] AC 465.
86. Central Trust Co v Rafuse, [1986] 2 SCR 147 at 206.
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elements of that action are fulfilled, even where the underlying facts also
create liability in tort. However, this conclusion does not end the matter. An
examination of the modern law of restitution suggests that in both cases the
Courts were justified in their concern over awarding the net proceeds of
production to the plaintiff. It is quite possible that those courts achieved the
right result, but for the wrong reasons.
C. The Measure of Recovery in Restitution
Although the critiques of Williston Wildcatters and Freyberg provide a
great deal of valuable analysis, they go a step too far in arguing that the
normal consequence of applying the restitutionary approach involves the
recovery of some measure of the proceeds of production. The same can be
said of a statement to the same effect made in an earlier article by one of the
present authors. 87 Recent Canadian decisions also assumed that an award in
restitution would produce this result. It is true that the American cases on
good faith trespass, as well as (in the writers’ view) the Sohio decision,
suggest that the innocent trespasser must pay to the lessor the net proceeds
of production after the termination of the lease. However, the understanding
of restitution has developed rapidly over the last quarter century and it is
important to examine whether these assumptions remain valid. It is often
the case that when principles from private law are adopted into oil and gas
law, they are perpetuated in subsequent oil and gas cases with little
reference to developments in their original context.88 As a result, while it is
true cases such as Williston Wildcatters that adopt the compensatory royalty
approach “are inconsistent with the bulk of authority” in natural resource
severance cases, 89 it is important to examine whether the bulk of authority
continues to represent the modern law of restitution.
There are two methods of awarding damages based on the gain made by
the defendant as a result of a wrong. Restitutionary damages are designed to
reverse a wrongful transfer value from the plaintiff to the defendant. James
Edelman provides an example that is similar in principle to some of the
cases involving oil and gas leases. Following the expiry of a lease, the
tenant wrongfully remained on the landlord’s premises, thus committing
trespass to land. The value wrongfully transferred to the tenant took the
form of the use of the landlord’s premises. The restitutionary damages for
the wrong committed by the tenant were measured by the fair market value

87. See Percy, supra note 24 at 113.
88. Ibid at 105.
89. Bankes, “Termination,” supra note 19 at 57.
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for the wrongful use of the premises gained by the tenant.90 The function of
the award of restitutionary damages in this case was not to compensate for
the loss suffered by the landlord, but to reverse the transfer of wealth from
the landlord by subtracting the objective benefit received by the tenant as a
result of the wrong it had committed. In quantifying damages, it did not
matter whether the tenant had made a spectacular profit or incurred a loss as
a result of the occupation of the landlord’s premises. In the words of Lord
Nicholls in Blake, the damages were based on “the price a reasonable
person would pay for the right of user.” 91
In contrast to restitutionary damages, the defendant’s gain can also be
stripped by disgorgement damages, which require the surrender of the
profits resulting from the wrong. In the entire field of civil remedies,
disgorgement is an unusual remedy. Unless a case can be made for
exemplary damages, it is rare for any award to strip profits from the
defendant, particularly where a breach of duty is not wilful. It is equally
rare in unjust enrichment. It is simply not the case as a general principle
that a tortfeasor or other wrongdoer is never permitted to profit from a
wrong. In the language of the American Restatement (Third) of Restitution
& Unjust Enrichment, disgorgement is found in some cases involving a
“calculating” or a “conscious” wrongdoer, 92 as in the case of a bad faith
trespass or one who knowingly publishes a libellous book. 93 In Blake, the
Court awarded disgorgement in the case of deliberate, criminal breaches of
contract and a failure to comply with an undertaking that was akin to a
fiduciary obligation. 94
In Canada, a well-known example of disgorgement occurred in Lac
Minerals Ltd v International Corona Resources Ltd, 95 in which Lac
Minerals Ltd (Lac Minerals) cynically, and in breach of confidence, used
information obtained during negotiations with International Corona
Resources Ltd to acquire and make large profits from land containing a rich
gold deposit. In this case, the unique nature of the land persuaded the Court
to make a proprietary award, by requiring Lac Minerals to disgorge the
property itself, through the device of the remedial constructive trust.
90. Edelman, supra note 83 at 67. The present account of restitutionary damages draws
heavily from chapter three of this book.
91. Supra note 73 at 278.
92. Restatement (Third) of Restitution & Unjust Enrichment § 40 Commentary, § 52.2
(Draft 2011) [American Restatement].
93. See e.g. Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome, [1972] AC 1027 (HL (Eng)).
94. Supra note 73 at 287–88.
95. [1989] 2 SCR 574.
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Disgorgement damages are also awarded to protect certain institutions by
removing the prospect of gain from even innocent wrongdoing. This
explains the use of disgorgement in cases of breach of fiduciary duty, where
the courts are vitally concerned to hold fiduciaries to the duties they have
assumed. As the Supreme Court of Canada recently noted, “disgorgement is
imposed to serve a prophylactic purpose, the relevant causation is the
breach of a fiduciary duty and the defendant’s gain (not the plaintiff’s loss).
Denying [the wrongdoer] profit generated by the financial interest that
constituted his conflict teaches faithless fiduciaries that conflicts of interest
do not pay.” 96
Where a court awards the lessor the net proceeds of production upon the
termination of the lease, it is in essence requiring disgorgement, in the form
of stripping the profits of tortious production from the lessee. Yet it is
impossible to describe the lessee in most of the Canadian cases as a
“conscious” or “calculating” or even as a deliberate wrongdoer. The lessee
is subject to the normal measure of damages in the law of torts and the
lessor may well have a restitutionary remedy, but neither of these
approaches is likely to result in disgorgement. The underlying principle of
damage awards throughout private law is designed to ensure that the
plaintiffs are compensated for losses that they have suffered. Those who fail
to respect property rights must pay the losses of the owner, unless their
conduct is so egregious as to attract punitive damages.
It is true that a claim for restitution for wrongdoing changes the focus of
inquiry from the loss suffered by the lessor to the enrichment obtained by
the lessee as a result of its wrongdoing. The normal remedy in the case of
restitution for wrongdoing, in the absence of conscious wrongdoing or the
need to protect vital institutions such as fiduciary relationships, focuses on
what the lessee gained from the wrongful occupation of the leased lands. In
the words of the Supreme Court of Canada, the function of a restitutionary
remedy is to give back to someone “something that has been taken from
them . . . or its equivalent value” 97 or, more simply put, restitution refers to
“the reversal of a transfer of value from a claimant to a defendant.”98
The application of this principle to terminated leases must involve an
examination of the value transferred from the lessor to the lessee when the
lease came to an end. At that time, the plaintiff lessor “has clearly been
deprived, as a result of the defendant’s wrongdoing, of the opportunity to

96. Strother v 3464920 Canada Inc, 2007 SCC 24, [2007] 2 SCR 177 at para 77.
97. See Citadel General Assurance, supra note 81 at para 30.
98. Edelman, supra note 83 at 36.
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rent the property to the defendant [or to another company] for the plaintiff’s
purposes at a fair return.” 99 In the cases considered in this article, because a
commercial well now exists on land owned by the lessor, the benefit or
value transferred to the lessee should be measured by the return that the
lessor would have been able to command by entering into a new lease with
either the defendant or another lessee. This approach suggests that the
courts may have been on the right track in Williston Wildcatters and
Freyberg when they enquired into the bonus and royalty rate that would
have been payable at the time the lease was terminated. However, this result
would not occur because the principles of justice and equity somehow
deprived the lessor of seeking a restitutionary remedy. The appeal to those
principles suggests that the assessment of damages is discretionary, rather
than guided by well-established principles. In fact, the results in these cases
are entirely consistent with an award of restitution.
The question then arises of the quantification of an award of damages
when, as sometimes occurs in the petroleum industry, 100 the lessor is
capable of producing the land itself or perhaps arranging production
through a contract operator. Both Williston Wildcatters and Freyberg
recognized, at least by implication, that the lessor might have a successful
claim for the net proceeds of production in this situation. However, perhaps
contrary to suggestions in those cases, this result would occur as a result of
compensatory damages in the law of torts rather than as an award of
restitutionary damages for tortious wrongdoing. An award in restitution
would still be measured by the return that the lessor would have been able
to obtain at the time the original lease terminated. However, the lessor has a
strong argument that an award of the net proceeds of production would be
required to place it in the position it would have occupied if the tort had not
occurred.
This conclusion suggests that there might be a divergence between
Canadian and American oil and gas law on the effect of an unexpectedly
terminated lease. However, the American case law is not entirely
consistent. Although many decisions continue to award the net proceeds of
production in the case of terminated leases, others suggest that the
appropriate measure of damages for unofficious trespass is compensatory
and should be based on the award of an appropriate royalty to the lessor. In

99. Maddaugh & McCamus, supra note 18 at 743.
100. See e.g. Canpar Holdings, supra note 17 and Republic Resources, supra note 22 as
examples of each possibility.
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Beck v Northern Natural Gas Company, 101 the gas company was
commissioned by state and federal authorities to store gas in the Viola
formation, where it held the storage rights. However, the gas company was
able to store a much greater amount of gas than originally contemplated
because the gas had migrated to a lower formation in which it did not hold
the storage rights. The case posed a classic conflict, because the fair rental
value of storage in the lower formation was $2.3 million, but the gas
company was able to generate additional profits of $12 million as a result of
inadvertently using the additional storage space without authorization. The
claimants had originally been awarded damages based on the reasonable
rental rate for the lower formation, but appealed on the basis that they were
entitled to an award of the profits that arose from the gas company’s
trespass. Their case for additional damages was dismissed because a
remedy based in an unjust enrichment did not justify profit stripping. The
purpose of profit stripping was not to reverse a transferred enrichment, but
to act as a deterrent in the case of bad faith trespass.
The American Restatement also reflects the approach of the Beck case
and recent Canadian decisions. Section 40 of the American Restatement
recognizes that the person who obtains a benefit by an act of trespass or
conversion is liable in restitution to the victim of the wrong. 102 The
commentary on the relevant article of the American Restatement states that
the conscious wrongdoer will be stripped of gains that result from
unauthorized interference with another’s property. However, the
restitutionary liability of the defendant without fault will not exceed the
value obtained in the transaction for which liability is imposed. As a result,
innocent trespassers and converters are liable in restitution for the value of
what they have gained, usually measured by the cost of a licence
(representing the fair value of obtaining access to the lands), but not for
consequential gains. These principles are expanded in Section 51, where the
remedy of eliminating profit from wrongdoing through disgorgement is
specifically restricted to the case of the conscious wrongdoer. In the case of
other wrongdoers, the commentary to Section 51 adds:
So long as benefits wrongfully obtained have an ascertainable
market value, that value is the minimum measure of the
wrongdoing defendant’s unjust enrichment, even if the
transaction produces no ascertainable injury to the claimant and
no ascertainable benefit to the defendant. Reasonable rental
101. 170 F.3d 1018 (10th Cir. 1999).
102. Supra note 92 at § 40.3.
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value or a reasonable royalty will often supply such a
measure. 103
The provisions of the new draft American Restatement are thus
consistent with recent Canadian case law. Restitutionary remedies are
clearly available in the case of innocent wrongdoing, but they focus on
reversing the value transferred from the plaintiff to the wrongdoer rather
than forcing the wrongdoer to disgorge its profits. The earlier American
cases and their Canadian counterparts, which award the net proceeds of
production to the lessor in cases of good faith trespass, are anomalous and,
as Canadian courts have suggested, should not be followed.

103. Ibid at § 51.9.
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